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Abstract: 
There is widespread agreement that Cloud 
computing has proven cost cutting and agility benefits. 
However, security and regulatory compliance issues are 
continuing to challenge the wide acceptance of such 
technology both from social and commercial 
stakeholders.  An important factor behind this is the fact 
that Clouds, and in particular public Clouds, are usually 
deployed and used within broad geographical or even 
international domains. This implies that the exchange of 
private and other protected data within the Cloud 
environment would be governed by multiple 
jurisdictions. These jurisdictions have a great degree of 
harmonisation, however, they present possible conflicts 
that are difficult to negotiate at run time. So far, 
important efforts have been taken in order to deal with 
regulatory compliance management for large distributed 
systems. However, measurable solutions are required 
for the context of Cloud. In this position paper, we 
propose an approach that starts with a conceptual model 
of explicit regulatory requirements for exchanging 
private data on a multijurisdictional environment and 
build on it in order to define metrics for non-
compliance or risks to compliance. These metrics will 
be integrated within usual data access-control policies 
and will be checked at policy analysis time before a 
decision to allow/deny the data access is made. 
Keywords: Cloud, Privacy, Data Access, Semantic 
Web, Requirements Engineering. 
1. Introduction 
Globalisation has changed the way societies 
and organisations work. As a consequence, technologies 
have had to evolve in order to be able to cope with new 
organisational needs. New concepts such as Cloud 
computing have emerged as approaches to mitigating 
the needs and facilitate those changes. However, the 
governance of such systems has to evolve for a 
multijurisdictional context. The complexity of such 
governance context makes it challenging to abstract and 
enforce applicable high level regulatory requirements as 
operational policies. On the plus side, if these 
challenges are tackled measurable compliance coverage 
on the Cloud would be possible. In this paper, we 
present an approach to bridging the gap between 
international regulatory frameworks on systems and 
data security and operational level policies for 
accessing computer resources through Cloud services.  
 
This approach is based on the semantic 
modelling of explicit legal requirements, which will be 
extracted from international legislation on systems and 
data security. This includes the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 
initiative in the United States and the Data Protection 
directive of the European Union. In this research, the 
aim is to build a generic model to enable the 
specification of these requirements in a standard way. 
In addition, the model should reflect both similarities 
and conflicts between the different legislations forming 
part of the Cloud’s governance framework. We further 
extend our model to capture prioritised non-compliance 
risks. This is done through the use of semantic rules that 
are complementary to our model. We finally integrate 
these risks as access control conditions. The satisfaction 
of these conditions would lead to denial of access to 
protected resources.   
The work on this paper builds on our previous 
efforts of an ontology-based approach to privacy 
compliance for the sharing of Health data in Europe. 
When completed, this work should add useful 
contributions to the area of regulatory compliance on 
Clouds domains. This includes: (1) the specification 
and formalisation of requirements extracted from 
diverse jurisdictions through the use of highly 
expressive semantic languages such as SWRL, RIF and 
LKIF; and (2) through the use of these formalisms, 
enabling the detection of situations of data disclosures 
or access that might present risks to regulatory 
compliance. This would allow the prevention of non-
compliance at access control run time.  
This paper is structured as follows. After 
presenting an introduction in Section 1, Section 2 
describes the proposed approach. In Section 3, we 
present the methodology which we are following to 
undertake this research. Section 4 covers the related 
work; and finally, the conclusions and future work are 
presented in Section 5. 
2. Description of Proposed Research 
Cloud computing allows efficient cost cutting 
through the use of custom-tailored, on-demand IT 
solutions. However, Cloud providers are still failing to 
guarantee measurable handling of many non-functional 
requirements, such as security and regulatory 
compliance [4]. Although they are newly emerging 
paradigms, Clouds are very similar in many aspects to 
other distributed computing environments.  
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 In particular, clouds are similar to large scale 
systems that are based on virtualised technologies such 
as grid systems [24]. These systems often fall short of 
providing measurable proof of compliance. The 
presence of such shortcomings may lead to decreased 
social trust and acceptance and therefore low business 
engagement with the Cloud business case [21]. In this 
research, we aim to specify and to enforce access 
control policies that allow the identification of 
compliance vulnerabilities at policy evaluation time. In 
our context, situations of compliance vulnerabilities 
will be specified through extending a model of traceable 
requirements extracted from high level policies. This 
latter is to be specified at an early stage of the research. 
Finally, the captured risks will be integrated as access 
control conditions.  
We aim to achieve these research objectives by 
following a phased but iterative approach shown as 
Figure 1. In the first phase, we shall extract enforceable 
requirements from different security and trust 
legislation that form part of the legal framework of 
Cloud Computing, including SOX [23] and privacy and 
data protection legislation. Due to the diversity and 
scope of this legislation, this research starts with a deep 
analysis of the legal requirements for sharing protected 
resources on the Cloud. Throughout this analysis, 
similarities as well as possible space for conflict 
between different legislation will be identified. We also 
consider for scalability concerns, identifying a selection 
of legal requirements with a high priority for 
enforcement. 
 
 
Figure 1: A Proposed Roadmap to Enforce Compliant Access Control (Denial of Access)  
In the second phase, we conceptually model 
the legal requirements identified in the previous phase. 
In addition, we specify and model situations of non-
compliance with these requirements. The modelling 
language we are using for these tasks should be 
expressive enough in order to handle uncertainty and 
contradictions of legislation. The complexity of such 
issues scales when working on multijurisdictional 
and/or multicultural domains of which we believe 
internationalised Clouds are an example. It is therefore 
necessary to look at a semantic language that is the 
most expressive and the most complete among the other 
languages constituting the semantic web stack [29]. One 
possible choice could be for the Web Ontology 
Language (OWL) and the Semantic Web rule Language 
(SWRL). However, in general (independently from the 
chosen rule language) the rules would be specified in 
the form of production rules, which capture information 
about the generic case of data disclosure as rule 
antecedent and dictate either a single legal requirement 
or a conjunction of requirements in their consequence. 
The following is an example of a privacy requirements 
rule indicating the necessity of obtaining patient 
consent when disclosing private data coming originally 
from France: 
    dataSharing(?x) 
∧ concerning(?x, ?data)  
∧ belongsto(?data, France)  
∧  isPrivate(?d)  
→ hasConsentNecessityRequirement(?x, 
NecessaryConsent) 
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In addition to requirements specification rules 
we also define rules that derive metrics for detecting 
risks to compliance with a legal requirement. For this 
reason, we need first to define metrics for testing for the 
satisfaction of each requirement. For example, we 
define a metric:  Patient Consent(X, Obtained Consent); 
presented in the form of an OWL axiom that checks for 
the satisfaction of the consent necessity requirements 
for a specific data disclosure X. In the cases where the 
requirement of necessary consent is not satisfied this 
means that the patient consent was not obtained prior to 
the data disclosure or the consent was obtained to 
operate for a specific period of time but has expired. 
Hence, one of the following axioms will hold true 
Patient Consent(X, No Consent) or Patient Consent(X, 
Expired Consent). The applicable risk derivation rules 
for this example are presented as follows:  
   dataSharing(?x) 
∧ hasConsentNecessityRequirement(?x, 
NecessaryConsent) 
→ hasComplianceRisk(?x, NoConsent) 
OR 
   dataSharing(?x)  
∧ hasConsentNecessityRequirement(?x,   
NecessaryConsent)  
→ hasComplianceRisk(?x, ExpiredConsent) 
The work we have done previously in 
(Rahmouni, 2011) attempted to model and formalise 
EU legislation on data protection through an OWL plus 
SWRL knowledgebase, while addressing some of the 
ambiguities and contradictions characterising it. This 
has allowed reasoning about policies from different 
European Member States (Rahmouni, 2009). However, 
despite its high expressiveness capability, SWRL has 
some limitations in  fully handling the non-
monotonicity of legislation. In other words, the 
absence, negation and other non-monotonic operations 
deprives SWRL from natively reasoning on conflicting 
rules.  
In order to overcome this efficiency we had to 
programmatically set a priority for rule execution by 
borrowing the “salience” keyword which is a reserved 
keyword of the rule engine that was used to execute the 
rules. In this research, we intend to explore an extension 
to SWRL or a change to a different semantic rule 
language such as RIF or LKIF. The work in (Gordon et 
al., 2009 and Palmirani et al., 2009) provides a 
comparison of the ability of different semantic rule 
languages for regulation modelling. Also the work in 
(Estrella, 2010) proposes LKIF, an extension to SWRL, 
as a better approach to dealing with non-monotonicity 
issues of legislation. This is because the LKIF rule 
language includes a built-in predicate which is enforced 
over rules and allows reasoning about rule priority for 
execution where conflicting rules are found. 
In the third phase, the semantically captured 
compliance risks could be mapped to metrics forming 
part of the access control conditions that are usually 
specified in a standard access control language such as 
XACML. In [20] and [21], we have shown how we 
model high level policies interpreted from European 
and national data protection law as privacy compliant 
access control policies. The use of semantic web 
technologies such as OWL and SWRL to allow 
integration of privacy constraints extracted from law as 
policy constraints, such as the requirements of consent 
and other safeguards of patient rights. In this previous 
work, we have checked for compliance at policy 
evaluation time by considering the positive 
authorisation mode. We believe that the process of 
checking for non-compliance, as suggested in this 
paper, would be more practical and efficient than the 
process of checking for compliance. For example, 
consider a specified sharing X of some protected 
resources on the Cloud. We suppose that X has a set of 
legal requirements with which a user must comply. In 
order to decide whether X is compliant, we need to 
check that each of the applicable requirements was 
satisfied. If so X would be permitted. In contrast, fewer 
checking operations are needed in order to measure 
non-compliance. This is because it is sufficient to know 
that at least one requirement from the set of 
requirements applicable to X was not satisfied, in order 
to infer non-compliance. 
At a later stage, the mapping of compliance 
risks to access control metrics would facilitate the 
integration of our approach within existing access 
control models, which manage access to protected data 
on Cloud infrastructures. However, these legacy models 
might require extensions in order to be able to process 
complex and dynamic constraints specified in our data 
access and usage polices. This is handled in the next 
phase.  
Finally in a fourth phase, we will design a 
prototype architecture for the enforcement of the 
suggested access control. In addition, we will 
implement the prototype and test it with regards to a 
specific case study (e.g. business enterprises, 
healthcare, etc.). We believe this approach would 
provide a preventative method for compliance 
management. Moreover, it provides mechanisms to 
allow enterprises working with Cloud infrastructures to 
adopt a measurable way of enforcing high level 
legislation within their operational processes. The 
abilities to detect vulnerable disclosures and to prevent 
them happening would also increase the level of social 
trust and acceptance of the Cloud paradigm. 
Furthermore, a tailored retrospective mechanism for 
auditing compliance at the time of access or usage 
control will also be considered in the future.  
3. Research Methodology 
For this research, we aim to follow the 
structured framework of Legal Knowledge Engineering 
and Enforcement ‘[REF?]. This framework will be 
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driven by an ontology of predefined data disclosure 
models along with an ontology of legal privacy and 
security requirements. In addition, our research 
framework includes three more layers that lead to the 
final stage of enforcing risk-aware access control 
policies in the Cloud operational processes. In total, our 
framework contains five layers as shown in Figure 2. In 
the following sections we present these layers in more 
detail.  
Most layers of this framework synchronise 
with the different phases of TUREP [15], which is a 
software engineering process that is very close to a 
universal and integrated requirement engineering 
framework. The TUREP model was proven successful 
in paving the way for a universal requirements 
engineering process through the involvement of its key 
characteristics as adhering to the engineering 
dimension. In particular, TUREP is in line with other 
research projects that have attempted to bridge the gap 
between business processes and system/data models 
and requirements specifications. These include 
BPMOntoSOA [32] (a semantic-based approach to 
generating service oriented requirements specifications 
from business process models), OntoREM [13, 14] (an 
ontology or knowledge driven requirements engineering 
methodology applied in the aerospace sector), 
OntoRAT [2] (an ontology driven requirements analysis 
tool) and generating conceptual data models from 
knowledge models such as OWL-DL models [7]. 
Therefore, these research projects are considered as part 
of the building blocks to developing an integrated but 
generalised framework with the TUREP model at the 
centre in attempting to evolve a universal integrated 
framework for requirements engineering. 
However, in order to satisfy the research 
problem discussed in this paper our framework includes 
an additional layer where we look at mapping legal 
requirements onto metrics representing risks for non-
compliance. These are also called compliance 
vulnerabilities.  
It is also worth mentioning before proceeding 
into the detailed description of the framework’s layers 
that due to the diversity and complexity of the different 
legislation (that forms part of the governance of 
disclosure of protected data across international 
borders) we consider restricting our focus to privacy 
legislation only, in particular, legislation governing the 
exchange of health data. This includes for example, the 
European Directive on Data protection and some US 
legislation such as the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA). The following sections 
present more details on the framework layers (as shown 
in Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: An Ontology-Driven Framework for Legal Requirements and Risks Engineering for the Exchange of Private 
Data on a Cloud Environment  
3.1.1. The Modelling Layer 
The modelling layer focuses on the design and 
production of a semantic model or an ontology of 
specified cases of data disclosures that take place within 
an international Cloud environment. In particular, we  
 
semantically represent cases of disclosures of data 
revealing information about a person’s health. 
Moreover, in this phase we also gather generic 
requirements described in text law. These requirements 
are then analysed according to their relevance to our 
251 
domain (i.e. the health domain and the relevance of the 
data type to cases of data disclosures we are interested 
in). Furthermore, due to the need to narrow down the 
scope to the time consuming nature of semantic 
modelling, the gathered requirements will be prioritised 
according to their importance to the task of effective 
data protection and privacy preservation. For example, 
the requirements of obtaining patient consent prior to 
disclosing their data seems to have higher importance 
compared to data anonymisation, which is important 
but not always required. After prioritisation, these 
requirements will be captured in an ontology or 
knowledge base. Both ontologies (i.e. the data 
disclosure context ontology and the privacy 
requirements ontology) set up the context for the 
domain for which we later formally specify applicable 
and fine grained legal requirements.  
This phase is in line with the initial phase of 
the TUREP model in which the requirements should be 
gathered, elicited and analysed. The next layer of the 
framework focuses on the formal specification of legal 
requirements and risks to compliance.  
3.1.2. The Generalisation Layer 
In this layer, we effectuate a set of tasks that 
focus on the generalisation of the context of data 
sharing or the disclosure which were specified in the 
previous layer. Each specific case of data disclosure 
will be mapped to a generic data processing context that 
is specified in text law. This is in order to conform to 
the nature of legislation that is generic in the way it is 
written, but has to be implemented or enforced in a case 
based manner. In this regard, we generalise our 
specialised cases of data disclosure in order to be able 
to match each of them onto a set of applicable legal 
requirements that has to be complied with before the 
disclosure is permitted.  
3.1.3. The Meta-Model Layer 
This layer illustrates a phase in which generic 
templates for requirements specification are formulated. 
Since we are dealing with legal requirements which are 
by nature specified, in text law, in the form of rules, it is 
more logical to formulate these requirements through 
the use of formal or logical rules, notably production 
rules. These rules capture information about the generic 
case of data disclosure and would dictate either a single 
requirement or a conjunction of requirements in their 
consequence. These generic rules will be instantiated, at 
a later stage, in order to specify the requirements 
applicable for specialised cases of data disclosure.  
In addition to requirements specification we 
also specify risks to compliance with these 
requirements in a way that allows, for each production 
rule specifying a requirement, associating it with a set 
of other rules defining risks to compliance with that 
specific requirement. The requirements specification 
and risk derivation rules will be used in the next phase 
of the framework in order to automatically generate 
applicable risk detection metrics. These metrics will 
serve to identify attempts to non-compliance at data 
access runtime. 
3.1.4. The Compliance Vulnerabilities 
Generation Layer 
In this layer, the rules produced as an output of 
the previous phase will be executed through adequate 
rule engines in order to derive applicable legal 
requirements. For example, in the context of disclosing 
a patient’s chest MRI, where the MRI was originally 
collected from a French hospital, the applicable 
requirements along with risks to complying with these 
requirements will be generated (as described in Figure 
3). 
Figure 3: Example of Legal Requirements and Risk Derived for a Given Disclosure of a Patient’s MRI. 
 
3.1.5. Enforcement Layer 
The fifth and final layer of our research 
framework looks at the enforcement of compliance 
requirements through the integration of risk metrics 
within the specification of access control policies  
 
governing the operational processes of the Cloud’s 
platforms. These metrics will be included in the 
conditions, which normally form part of formal policies 
specification. The conditions describing the satisfaction 
of a risky situation or compliance vulnerability will be 
Data Disclosure Subject Legal requirements Legal Risks 
Type of Data to be Disclosed: 
Patient’s chest MRI Country: France  
 
Consent Necessity 
Necessary-Consent 
 
Consent Necessity 
No-Consent or Expired-Consent 
 
 
Consent Specificity 
Specific Consent 
 
Consent Specificity 
Broad Consent 
 
 
Consent Explicitness 
Explicit-Consent 
 
Consent Explicitness 
Implicit-Consent 
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checked at run time i.e. when a policy decision is being 
made. If at least one risk metric is validated during this 
check then the applicable decision will be a denial of 
access and/or disclosure of the protected data. 
4. Related Work 
Since there is only limited work on compliance 
management in Clouds, in this section we focus on 
related areas such as compliance management in 
general i.e. in the software development life cycle and 
at policy enforcement time. Moreover, we also cover 
the state-of-the-art in formal policies and regulation 
specification and enforcement languages.  
4.1. Compliance Management Approaches 
Most of the existing work in the area of 
compliance management deals with a particular 
problem of compliance auditing. This includes for 
example, Hippocratic databases [1] and some semantic 
web-based approaches such as [31] and [9]. These 
approaches however are not sufficient for our study. We 
believe that in order to achieve effective compliance 
management we need not only to rely on retrospective 
approaches, but complementary proactive approaches 
are also needed in order to show adoption of good 
practice and more assurance for compliance. Examples 
of these approaches are described in [22], [20] and [11]. 
The work in [22] and [20] had particular emphasis in 
European privacy legislation, whereas Gowadia [11] 
looked at integrating requirements interpreted from 
data-sharing agreements. We believe that relying on 
secondary legislations such as contracts, protocols and 
agreement does not guarantee completeness of 
compliance when compared to primary text law. The 
research presented in [22] does not check for 
compliance with explicit fine grained legal 
requirements extracted from legislation, rather only 
generic requirements interpreted from high level legal 
principles have been considered.    
In particular, our work presented earlier in [21] 
attempts to model and formalise EU Legislation 
through an OWL plus SWRL knowledgebase. The 
approach however had some limitations linked to the 
inability of SWRL to fully handle the non-monotonicity 
of legislation. The reason for these limitations was 
explained in section 2 of this paper. In this current 
research, we intend to explore an extension to SWRL or 
a change to a different semantic rule language such as 
RIF or LKIF in order to deal with these limitations.  
In [20] and [21], we have shown how we 
model high level policies interpreted from European 
and national data protection law as privacy compliant 
access control policies. The use of semantic web 
technologies such as OWL and SWRL allowed the 
integration of privacy constraints extracted from law, 
such as requirements of consent and other safeguards of 
patient rights, as policy constraints. Also, this solution 
has permitted the checking for requirements satisfaction 
at run time and makes an access control decision 
according to the finding. We believe it would be more 
practical and less time demanding if we manage to 
detect, at run time, situations of non-compliance and 
prevent them happening. That is the object of this work. 
4.2. Formal Policy and Regulation 
Enforcement Languages 
High level legal rules need to be interpreted at 
an operational level so that specific decisions induced 
by events can be taken. For this purpose, we need to 
investigate the expressiveness and ability of some 
promising policy languages that have been 
advantageous in the mapping of requirements from 
privacy laws and also guidelines into operational 
controls. After going through some data protection 
legislation, we noticed that the legislation mainly 
dictates requirements and expectations that need to be 
fulfilled by a data controller throughout the whole 
lifecycle of the management of the personal data in 
question. These requirements could be classified into 
two categories (1) obligations related to the access and 
usage of personal data based on the data subject’s 
consent and/or complying with pre-identified usage 
purposes and (2) obligations to be fulfilled on the 
collected data such as data retention, deletion and 
correction, notification to the data subject, secondary 
use of data and data transfer to third parties.  
A considerable amount of work has been done 
in the area of security policy languages. However, many 
of these approaches have mainly captured the access 
control aspects of these obligations and do not focus on 
the duties and the expectations on how personal data 
has to be handled. Some approaches have shown 
awareness of the need to deal with other aspects of the 
obligations than just access control obligations but they 
usually stop at the specification of these controls or 
tried to enforce them only at local domains where the 
data resides. This gives less control and traceability on 
how data will be handled after the access is permitted 
and data is transferred to an external domain. In the 
following sections, a review of different categories of 
formal policy languages is presented that have been 
used to enforce security and privacy controls. 
4.2.1. Semantic-Based Languages 
A semantic-based description of policies 
through ontology allows easy access to the policies’ 
information and facilitates capturing the relations 
between policies, entities and other policies. It is also 
possible to query ontology in order to get useful 
information. This is rather different from traditional 
languages that define only predefined queries in order 
to access information about policies. However, most of 
the languages that have been designed so far rely on a 
pure OWL syntax. These policies present some 
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limitations in terms of expressiveness, which is in turn 
inherited from known limitations. Moreover, as in all 
ontology-based systems, keeping up with version 
changes to the ontologies as well as the integration and 
interoperability between different ontologies in the 
same domain continues to be an open research area.  
Rei [12] is a policy framework that allows 
specification, analysis and reasoning about declarative 
policies. Rei adopts a rule-based approach to specifying 
semantic policies. Rules are expressed as OWL 
properties of the policy and are classified as rights, 
prohibitions, obligations and dispensations. Though 
represented in OWL-Lite, Rei still allows the definition 
of variables that are used as placeholders, as in Prolog 
[26]. The definition of constraints follows the typical 
pattern of rule-based programming languages, like 
Prolog, i.e. defining a variable and the required value of 
that variable for the constraint to be satisfied. In this 
way, Rei overcomes one of the major limitations of the 
OWL language and more generally of description 
logics, i.e. the inability to define variables. On the other 
hand, the choice of expressing Rei rules similarly to 
declarative logic programs prevents it from exploiting 
the full potential of the OWL language. OWL inference 
is essentially considered as an oracle, i.e. the Rei policy 
engine treats inferences from OWL axioms as a virtual 
fact base. Hence, Rei rules cannot be exploited in the 
reasoning process that infers new conclusions from the 
existing OWL ontologies, which means that the Rei 
engine is able to reason about domain-specific 
knowledge, but not about policy specification. 
Therefore, in order to classify policies, the variables in 
the rules need to be instantiated, which reduces it to a 
constraint satisfiabilty problem.  
The KAoS [25] framework through its policy 
services allows the specification, management, conflict 
resolution and enforcement of policies within agent 
domains. KAoS adopts an OWL-DL ontology-based 
approach to describing and specifying policies and 
context conditions. The ontological modelling of the 
policies helps reasoning about both domain and policy 
specification and facilitates the detection of policy 
conflicts at policy definition time. However, a pure 
OWL approach encounters some difficulties with regard 
to the definition of some kinds of policies. Also the gap 
between the specification and the actual implementation 
of such policies cannot be coped with automatically 
[27]. The lack of facilities to describe variables makes it 
difficult to define policies that contain parametric 
constraints, which are assigned a value only at 
deployment or runtime. For this reason, KAoS 
developers have introduced role-value maps as OWL 
extensions, which allow KAoS to specify constraints 
between properties’ values expressed in OWL terms 
and to define policy sets i.e. groups of policies that 
share a common definition but can be singularly 
instantiated with different parameters. The proposed 
extensions effectively add sufficient expressive 
flexibility to KAoS to represent the policies discussed 
in this paper. However, non-experienced users may still 
have difficulties in writing and understanding these 
policies without the help of the KPAT [25] graphical 
user interface. 
4.2.2. XML-Based Privacy Policy Languages 
Some XML-based policy languages were 
formalised originally for the purpose of specifying 
operational controls to the access of protected data in 
general, but they evolved to formally represent some 
policies of legal aspects and, in particular, legal privacy 
and data protection policies.  
The work on the Platform for Privacy 
Preferences Project by W3C has lead to the production 
of the P3P [16] specification. P3P enables users to 
express privacy practices of their websites in a standard 
format that can be retrieved automatically by user 
agents. P3P user agents allow users to be informed of 
site practices (in both machine and human-readable 
formats) and to automate decision-making based on 
these practices when appropriate [5]. However, there 
are some shortcomings associated with the 
enforceability of P3P policies such as (1) predefined 
types of purposes for allowing access to personal data 
make it difficult for organizations to define their own 
purposes (2) unavailability of read, write, delete, 
append actions (3) P3P does not use or specify any post 
processing obligations such as notification to data 
subject, or retention of data for a specified period and 
(4) P3P has limited conditions of data processing i.e. 
simple opt in/ opt out conditions [3]. 
The Enterprise Privacy Authorization 
Language (EPAL) [18] was designed to enable the 
translation of privacy policies into an XML based 
computer language. The resulting coded translation of 
human policy into Information Technology policy 
allows a complex description of the internal data 
handling practices needed for enforcing the privacy 
policy. Similarly, XACML [30] is an XML 
specification and syntax for expressing policies 
controlling the access of information through the 
internet. XACML provides enterprises with a flexible 
and structured way of managing access to resources.  
XACML is based on a subject-target-action-condition 
policy syntax applied to XML documents that can 
update individual document elements. Like other 
policies languages that are based on XML, XACML 
lacks the required semantics to allow for semantic 
heterogeneity and interoperability especially when 
managing data access within environments that involve 
multiple organisations.  
4.3. Other Formal Policy Languages and 
Techniques 
Other types of formal policy language that 
have recently emerged and that are worth mentioning 
are declarative languages that are written on a 
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programming language syntax and are easier to 
integrate or embed in code snippets while developing 
applications or services that are meant to handle or 
manage protected data. One of the most famous 
examples of these languages is Ponder [6], which is a 
declarative object-oriented language for the 
specification of management and security policies. It 
provides structuring techniques to serve the complexity 
of policy administration in large enterprise information 
systems. It has been recently extended to a more 
advanced version named Ponder2 [28]. This language 
offers a wide range of interesting models of concepts 
such as hierarchical data structure for organizing 
managed objects, a policy evaluation points (PEPs) 
scheme, and their conflict resolution strategy. 
Fundamentally, Ponder2 distinguishes between two 
policy types that are obligations and authorisations. 
Usually the obligation policies define the actions that 
policy subjects must perform on target entities when 
specific relevant events occur. Authorisation policies 
are usually used to specify operations a subject is 
authorised to do on target objects. Also, Ponder2 
includes some composite policy types that allow the 
grouping of basic policies into the shape of roles or 
relationships policies. However, the policy language of 
Ponder2 does not allow definition of obligation actions 
that must be executed before or after an authorisation.  
5. Conclusions 
The work presented in this position paper has 
been based on our previous work [20, 21], which 
presents an innovative approach to privacy compliance 
management for the sharing of Health data in Europe. 
In this work, we consider the problem of privacy 
compliance from a software engineering point of view 
where compliance is considered as a Non-Functional 
Requirement for distributed systems deployed at the 
international level e.g. International Clouds. As stated 
previously our methodology conforms to the TUREP 
[15] software engineering model that has proven 
successful and effective for structuring requirement 
engineering processes in different domains.  
The extension to our previous work include: 
(1) extending the geographical scope of the covered 
legislation from an European to an international level 
(2) adopting a more advance and expressive formal 
regulation specification language (3) detecting risks to 
compliance (also called compliance vulnerabilities) 
through the use of well defined metrics at access control 
runtime and preventing them from happening and 
finally (4) testing and validation of the proposed 
solution on a Cloud environment. Our future work will 
focus on putting our methodology into practice. For 
testing and validation purposes, a case study with rich 
scenarios of private data sharing in healthcare will be 
carefully selected and applied to the different layers of 
our requirements engineering framework. 
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